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HE TEXAS ECONOMY expanded at a modest pace in 1996,
following more intense growth in 1994 and 1995. The
strength of the oil and gas industry was a welcome surprise
last year, and the stabilization of the Mexican economy
helped Texas exports. Texas’ role as a distribution hub con-
tinued to enhance growth, as in previous years. On the other
hand, a weak semiconductor industry and a severe drought tem-
pered growth. Perhaps the greatest restraint on job growth, however,
was the tightest labor market in a decade. While the changes of 1996
affected individual cities to varying degrees, Texas’ diverse economy
prevented any single factor from dominating the state’s expansion.
What Helped Growth in 1996?
Oil and Gas. The energy industry helped bolster the 1996 expan-
sion. In particular, the upstream energy industry—the production
and exploration side of the business—was strong in 1996. One 
reason was higher oil and natural gas prices. Stock prices of drilling,
exploration and production firms reflected the industry’s strength, 
Tas Chart 1 shows. Another source of 
the industry’s strength was technologi-
cal improvements that have allowed
firms to downsize while increasing
productivity.
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Advancements in technology have
lowered production costs worldwide
and renewed interest in drilling in the
Gulf of Mexico. The gulf’s deep waters
and large salt deposits hindered the 
discovery of oil with older technologies.
The recent strong interest in the Gulf of
Mexico is largely a product of important
new tools such as three-dimensional
seismic imaging, coiled tubing and 
measurement-while-drilling, which have
lowered drilling costs, reduced risk and
widened the range of economic pros-
pects available to the industry. These
advances have lowered the cost of find-
ing oil all over the world. For example,
exploration and development costs in
the United States fell from about $7 per 
barrel in 1991 to about $4 in 1995. The
industry can now be profitable with
lower oil prices.
One indication of the energy indus-
try’s current strength is the Texas rig
count—the number of rigs drilling for
new wells—which climbed to post–
Gulf War levels in December. Although
this recent increase looks feeble next 
to rig counts during the oil industry’s
boom years, the comparison is mis-
leading because improvements in tech-
nology have enabled the industry to 
do more with fewer rigs. For example,
the drilling success ratio for new field
wildcat wells—the percentage that are
not dry holes—nearly doubled over the
past 10 years.
Not only is the industry using fewer
rigs, it’s also improving labor produc-
tivity. Since the height of the oil and 
gas industry boom in 1982, this sector
has shed nearly 170,000 jobs in Texas,
more than half its 1982 employment.
With competitive cost pressures and
new technology, the oil industry is
smaller but also stronger and more
profitable than in past years.
2 Increased
competition has led firms to outsource
many functions to reduce costs and shift
risks. Much work done by oil industry
firms in the early days is now done by
contractors and consultants. Thus, the
industry can contract or expand much
more quickly in response to market
conditions. Another result of this in-
creased competition is a consolidation
of the industry into major oil cities such
as Houston and Dallas.
While technological improvements
and industry restructuring have caused
a downward trend in upstream energy
industry employment over the past sev-
eral years, higher energy prices have
helped stem the decline. Oil and gas 
extraction employment stabilized, and
oil field machinery manufacturing and
services experienced strong employ-
ment growth in 1996.
Furthermore, what’s good for the 
energy industry is still good for Texas.
Although downstream energy firms
such as refining and petrochemical
companies are hurt by higher oil prices,
the state as a whole still benefits. Work
done at the Dallas Fed shows that for
each sustained $1 increase in oil prices,
Texas gains about 16,000 jobs.
3 How-
ever, overall labor tightness in Texas 
is also affecting the energy sector, re-
straining growth in both white-collar
and blue-collar jobs. Geophysicists, 
petroleum engineers, machinists and
roughnecks are all in high demand.
Mexico. Exports to Mexico have been
particularly important to Texas. In the
first half of 1996, the state sent one-third
of its export goods to Mexico, while the
United States sent 9 percent of its total
exports to Mexico. The dramatic decline
of the peso in December 1994 and 
subsequent recession had a significant
impact on the state’s exports to Mexico.
Dallas Fed economists have estimated
that had the peso crisis not occurred,
Texas exports to Mexico would have
been 31 percent higher in 1995.
4
Since the peso devaluation, the Mexi-
can economy has stabilized. After turn-
ing positive in the third quarter of 1995,
real Mexican GDP growth averaged 
an annual rate of 6.7 percent in the 
first three quarters of 1996. Conse-
quently, Texas’ exports to Mexico accel-
erated. Between the fourth quarter of
1995 and the second quarter of 1996,
exports to Mexico increased 17 percent,
surpassing the pre-crisis level, as shown
in Chart 2.
With this improvement in the Mexi-
can economy, border retail sales also
strengthened in the first half of 1996.
However, the increase was not enough
to provide much of a boost to retail
trade employment in border cities. Flat
retail employment, combined with a
leveling off in border construction and
manufacturing job growth, restrained
border employment growth.
Distribution Hub. Texas’ role as a
distribution hub continued to stimulate
growth in 1996. Spurred by the effects
of trucking deregulation, distribution
activity increased with a 6.6 percent
jump in trucking and warehousing em-
ployment in 1996. The industry pro-
vides easy access to North and Latin
America, and its strength is evident in
the continued expansion around the
D/FW International and Alliance air-
ports and in the strong warehousing 
activity in Dallas, Fort Worth and El
Paso. Another active distribution hub is
the Houston Ship Channel, the nation’s
second largest port in terms of cargo
volume.
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160Construction. The construction and
real estate industries have been bright
spots for Texas. Both benefited hand-
somely from firm expansions and relo-
cations into the state. After good years
in 1994 and 1995, construction activity
rose at a strong pace again in 1996, with
increases in both residential and non-
residential construction (Chart 3). Dal-
las and Fort Worth saw particularly high
growth, with companies drawn into 
the area by the convenient distribution
facilities of the D/FW International and
Alliance airports. In Dallas alone, over
12 million square feet of industrial
space was added in 1996, after a gain of
8 million square feet in 1995.
The office market also profited from
firm relocations and expansions. Occu-
pancy rates in Austin’s office market
and Dallas’ suburban office market
have risen above the U.S. average, and
rents are going up. However, Texas 
is still a bargain, with prime Dallas 
office space renting for about $20 per
square foot, compared with average
citywide rents of $25 in Chicago and
$21 in Atlanta and Minneapolis.
Homebuilders enjoyed a banner year
in 1996. From January through Sep-
tember, the Dallas/Fort Worth single-
family market ranked fourth most active
in the nation. Because of robust de-
mand and shrinking inventories, prices
for existing homes in major Texas cities
rose at rates above the national average.
Despite a recent cooling in new home
demand, the strong increase in home-
building earlier in the year means 1996
will surpass the excellent record posted
in 1995.
These increases in industrial, resi-
dential and office building have caused
a 6 percent increase in Texas construc-
tion employment in 1996, above the 
5.5 percent rise at the national level. In
addition, construction-related segments
of the manufacturing and retail sales 
industries flourished in 1996 because of
strong building activity.
What Hindered Growth in 1996?
Semiconductors. After being a
source of strength for Texas employ-
ment in recent years, the high-tech
manufacturing industry weathered a less
robust year in 1996 caused by weakness
in the semiconductor industry. Semi-
conductor production is a major part 
of high-tech manufacturing in Texas. In
fact, if Texas were a nation, it would 
be the fifth largest producer of semi-
conductors. The industry’s fortunes
changed in early 1996, and a barometer
for the industry’s health, the book-to-
bill ratio for semiconductors, fell.
5
The Standard & Poor’s 500 semicon-
ductor stock price index also suffered 
a deep decline.
The industry responded with a
midyear flurry of layoffs, hiring freezes
and plant construction slowdowns.
Chart 4 shows how the weakness in
semiconductors put a damper on Texas’
rapidly growing high-tech manufactur-
ing industry, which includes electronic
and nonelectrical equipment and in-
struments and related products. After
growing at a vigorous rate of 7.3 per-
cent in 1995, high-tech manufacturing
growth fell to 2.5 percent in 1996.
Following three quarters of weak-
ness, the book-to-bill ratio bounced
back in the fourth quarter of 1996. Most
recently, business contacts in the indus-
try report increased confidence that the
industry has bottomed out and is poised
for positive growth in 1997, but at more
moderate levels than in 1994 and 1995.
Drought. The rural areas of Texas
were hit hard by a relatively short but
severe drought last year. The wheat
crop was ravaged, and feed prices
soared. Lack of water, forage and feed
forced producers to accelerate the liqui-
dation of their herds, despite rock-
bottom cattle prices. Disaster relief and
crop insurance helped mitigate losses,
but farmers and nearby communities
felt the pinch of lowered incomes.
Many farmers and ranchers had diffi-
culty repaying their loans, and a num-
ber of producers chose to discontinue
production, perhaps influenced by the
impending phase-out of government
payments.
Labor Market Tightness. In addi-
tion to the effects of the drought and
the semiconductor price drop, tightness
in the labor market slowed employment
growth in 1996. The Texas unemploy-
ment rate in October hit its lowest level
in 15 years, and the unemployment rate
for nonborder areas was substantially
less than the nation’s (Chart 5 ). Overall
labor force growth slowed in Texas in
1996 as it picked up in the nation.
Chart 2
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“Homebuilders enjoyed a banner year in 1996.”These numbers are consistent with the
Dallas Fed’s survey of business condi-
tions, which has been reporting labor
market tightness for some time across a
wide variety of sectors. Improvements
in the California and Mexico economies
may have contributed to the tightness
by reducing migration to Texas from
these areas.
Outlook
Texas’ employment growth may slow
in 1997 to about 2 percent from the 2.3
percent posted in 1996. Factors that
benefited Texas in 1996 will continue to
help the state in 1997 but won’t give as
much of a boost as in the past.
Higher energy prices will continue to
help the economy. However, oil and
gas prices are not expected to go up
further—if anything, they’ll decline in
1997. The vigor in the industry will con-
tinue, but the growth rate may be
somewhat lower.
Similarly, a growing Mexican econ-
omy will be a plus for Texas. But after
bouncing back with a 34 percent annual
growth rate in 1996, exports to Mexico
are expected to grow at a rate closer to
the 10-year average of 14 percent.
The current growth in the construc-
tion industry should also decelerate to
sustainable levels. Lower migration to
Texas is expected to help stabilize resi-
dential construction growth. Nonresi-
dential construction should continue 
to rise, a result of previously planned
office construction projects. Also, indus-
trial and retail construction may slow in
1997, with recent warnings of over-
building. This, in turn, foreshadows a
slower year for wholesale and retail 
employment growth.
Other service sectors may also slow.
High fuel costs, rising trucking industry
wages and a slowdown in warehouse
construction will affect the transporta-
tion and distribution industries. Also,
the tighter labor market may restrain
overall growth and cause a shift from
temporary employment to manufactur-
ing sectors as more manufacturing firms
hire proven temporary workers away
from temporary employment agencies.
Although Texas’ cost differential with
the nation is slowly subsiding, the
state’s costs should remain below the
national average in 1997. Texas’ wages,
rents and housing prices are still be-
low the nation’s. Therefore, the state’s
cost advantage and its role as a prime
distribution hub should continue to aid
further expansions and relocations into
the region.
The national economy and labor





Steve Brown, D’Ann Petersen, Fiona Sigalla, Lori Taylor and Made-
line Zavodny contributed to this outlook.
1 See Bill Gilmer, “Oil Extraction in the Southwest,” Southwest Econ-
omy, Issue 4, 1996.
2 See Gilmer (1996).
3 Steve Brown and Mine Yücel, “The Energy Industry: Past, Present
and Future,” Southwest Economy, Issue 4, 1995.
4 See Southwest Economy, Issue 5, a NAFTA retrospective, Septem-
ber/October 1996.
5 The book-to-bill ratio is the ratio of shipments to orders.
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Chart 4
Semiconductor Industry Retrenches
S&P stock index High-tech manufacturing employment
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SOURCES: Standard & Poor’s Compustat; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Semiconductor Industry Association.
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WHATÕSINSTOREFORTEXASCITIES?
San Antonio, Austin
Poised for Job Growth
Employment growth in most parts of
South Texas should pick up in 1997. As the
Mexican recovery spreads beyond the export
sectors and real wages begin to increase, the return of
Mexican shoppers and vacationers to the border and San 
Antonio will boost these economies.
Although employment growth in South Texas has sur-
passed the state average over the past 10 years, the region’s
performance since 1994 has been relatively weak. The main
factors behind the weakness are the sharp fall in the peso’s
value in late 1994 and the semiconductor price collapse in
early 1996.
The importance of the tourism industry to San Antonio 
appears to have softened the blow of the peso devaluation
there. The continued flow of U.S. tourists to these areas likely
had an important positive impact, but the failure of Mexican
tourists to return in large numbers weakened employment
growth in 1996.
While the improvement in the Mexican economy this 
year will boost the tourism industry in San Antonio, several
other factors will restrain growth.
The 1996 drought and a lawsuit filed
by an environmental group resulted 
in tight residential water restrictions 
and an increased perception among 
businesses that the city may not have an 
adequate water supply to maintain a strong long-
run rate of economic growth. Cutbacks in 
the military also represent a challenge to the city. Overall,
growth in 1997 will likely be close to the modest pace ex-
perienced in 1996.
Austin, one of the nation’s fastest growing metropolitan
areas in the 1990s, had the state’s strongest employment
growth in 1995. Job growth slowed sharply last year, however,
as semiconductor prices fell and overall manufacturing em-
ployment growth slowed from 8.4 percent in 1995 to 2 per-
cent in 1996. Another factor likely affecting employment
growth in Austin is tightness in the labor market. The city’s
unemployment rate averaged 3.1 percent in the first 10
months of 1996 even as employment growth slowed. The
pace of growth in Austin is likely to accelerate in 1997 as
semiconductor prices bottom out and the high-tech sector
continues to gain momentum.
—Keith R. Phillips
Houston’s Steady Growth Should Continue
Houston’s wage and salary job growth averaged 2.7 per-
cent in 1994 and 3.1 percent in 1995 and held to a steady pace
near 2.5 percent throughout 1996. The Houston labor market
has tightened month by month since 1994, with the unem-
ployment rate dipping below 5 percent in late 1996.
For Houston, 1997 promises to be more of the same: job
growth near 2.5 percent and economic expansion driven by
factors similar to those that have been at work since 1994. 
According to the best estimates available, Houston’s growth
industries remain divided 50–50 between those related 
to oil and natural gas and those independent of energy. 
A strong national economy, operating at full 
employment, and high levels of industrial 
capacity utilization since 1994 have pro-
vided a powerful stimulus to Houston’s
big nonenergy companies, such as
Compaq Computers, Continental 
Airlines, BFI and American General
Insurance.
Important weaknesses continue, however, at two of 
Houston’s biggest non-oil growth centers: the Texas Medical
Center (TMC) and the Johnson Space Center (JSC). Cost con-
tainment in medical care has led to a steady reduction in 
jobs at the TMC. Similarly, budget cuts sustained by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration have led JSC
to cut several hundred jobs per year. Neither center is a major
drag on overall growth, but these centers are not providing
Houston the billions of dollars in stimulus they delivered from
1987 to 1991.
Energy will be the key to Houston’s growth in 1997. Oil
prices over $20 per barrel and natural gas over $2 per thou-
sand cubic feet generated big cash flows for oil extrac-
tion, services and machinery companies in 1996,
which in turn will bring numerous capital
projects to Houston in 1997. Houston’s oil
service and durable manufacturing in-
dustries surged through late 1996, and
this growth should carry over well
into 1997.
—Robert W. Gilmer












1996 Employment SharesHE 1996 WELFARE reform bill
has been hailed by many as a
sweeping improvement of the
American welfare system. In the
words of President Clinton, the
bill is intended to “end welfare
as we know it” by making it “a second
chance, not a way of life.”
1 Supporters
of the bill characterize it as an attempt
to rescue the poor from a well-intended
system whose actual effect has been to
“reward the behavior which leads to
poverty and punish the behavior which
leads out of poverty.”
2 A bipartisan con-
sensus allowed the bill to pass both
houses of Congress by a large majority,
and public opinion polls show that
most Americans support its contents.
One senator summarizes the public 
sentiment that led to the bill’s passage:
“If anybody thinks the children that 
are under this welfare system are get-
ting a good deal today, then frankly 
I don’t know what would be a rotten
deal because they’re getting the worst
of America.”
3
Opponents of the welfare reform bill
express a different view. By encourag-
ing people to leave the welfare rolls,
the measure “punish[es] those…least
able to cope”
4 and reflects “ignorance
and prejudice far more than the experi-
ence of this nation’s poorest working
and welfare families.”
5 One supporter 
of the old welfare system argues that
the bill “does actual violence to poor
children, putting millions of them into
poverty who were not in poverty be-
fore.”
6 Said Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, “It is as if we are going 
to live only for this moment and let our
future be lost.”
7
Clearly, welfare reform is a con-
troversial issue. It is also one of the
most important issues facing the 
American people: the share of GDP 
devoted to welfare expenditures has 
increased tenfold since 1965, while 
the poverty rate has remained largely
unchanged. How was the old welfare
system constructed? How does the 
welfare reform bill attempt to change
the system? Does the bill truly end 
welfare as we know it—and if it does,
will its primary effect be to encourage
work or to harm children? These are 
questions that an analysis of welfare 
reform must answer.
The System Before Reform
When most people hear the word wel-
fare, they think of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). Estab-
lished by the Social Security Act of 1935
“for the purpose of maintaining and
strengthening family life,” AFDC gives
cash payments to poor families. AFDC
has a total budget of approximately $25
billion and represents about 1 percent
of total government expenditures.
Chart 1 illustrates the degree to
which AFDC benefits vary across states.
In 1994, the average monthly payment
to an AFDC family was $382, but bene-
fits ranged from a low of $123 in Mis-
sissippi to a high of $740 in Alaska.
Strong regional trends are apparent,
with considerably more generous bene-
fits in New England and West Coast
states than in the South. Eight states of-
fered benefits in excess of $500 per
month, and seven offered benefits of
less than $200 per month.
Two other programs that do not pro-
vide cash payments to poor families
also contribute to the social safety net 
in America: Food Stamps and Medicaid
(Table  1). The Food Stamp program
gives vouchers to the poor that are 
redeemable for food, while the Medic-
aid program provides poor individuals
with medical services. Although many
people believe that AFDC is the largest
welfare program, the Food Stamp pro-
gram is almost exactly the same size 
as AFDC and the Medicaid program 
is five times larger than AFDC. The
combined share of the federal budget
devoted to these programs is approxi-
mately 6 percent.
Before the welfare reform bill was
signed into law, eligible families in 
each program could receive benefits for
an unlimited amount of time and were
not required to work in exchange for
their benefits. Benefits were funded
from a mix of state resources and per-
recipient matching funds from the 
federal government, which means that
high-benefit states tended to receive
larger subsidies from the federal gov-
ernment than low-benefit states. There
were no restrictions on the eligibility of
legal immigrants. And, by law, states
T
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$501 or morewere required to treat all immigrants as
if they were legal immigrants—states
were forbidden to ask whether a recip-
ient was in the country illegally and for-
bidden to deny benefits on that basis.
Term Limits and Work Requirements
The welfare reform law changes wel-
fare programs in several respects. First,
it imposes a five-year lifetime limit on
welfare benefits. Second, it mandates
that anyone who remains on the wel-
fare rolls for more than two years must
work to receive benefits. Third, the 
bill requires that 25 percent of the 
recipients in each state’s welfare case-
load work by 1997. Fourth, the bill 
restricts the eligibility of legal immi-
grants for welfare programs. Fifth, the
bill converts federal funding from per-
recipient matching funds into lump-sum
block grants.
How are the changes likely to affect
welfare recipients? The term limit and
work requirement provisions have been
hailed as the most significant changes in
American welfare policy since the New
Deal, and there is reason to believe 
that such provisions could reduce the
number of people who receive public
assistance. However, the specific provi-
sions in the welfare reform law contain
significant loopholes for states that
choose to employ them. An exception
to the first provision stipulates that one-
fifth of a state’s caseload may be ex-
empted from term limits if the state
asserts (with or without cause) that the
loss of benefits would create “hardship”
for those who have reached their five-
year limit. An exception to the second
provision allows states to define “work”
in as untraditional a manner as they
choose. An exception to the third pro-
vision lets states calculate the number
of recipients who do not have to work
by 1997 as 75 percent of their 1995
caseloads rather than as 75 percent of
current recipients, which is significant
because the number of people receiv-
ing public assistance declined (in some
cases significantly) between 1995 and
1996. In addition, a general exception
to the bill permits states to relabel a
portion of their funds from the federal
government as a “social services block
grant,” which may be given to recipi-
ents who exceed their time limit or
refuse to work.
The welfare reform bill’s enforcement
mechanism is especially problematic. If
a state does not fulfill the requirements
of the bill, it is penalized by a reduction
in federal funding. Since states actually
define most of the requirements they
must meet, states have an incentive to
impose lenient requirements to lessen the
probability of punishment. Moreover,
states are free to seek permission from
the executive branch of the federal gov-
ernment to waive provisions of the bill
with which they disagree. If a waiver is
granted to a particular state, the state
cannot be punished for violating that
portion of the welfare reform law for
which the state received a waiver.
How might the time limit and work
requirement provisions operate in prac-
tice? If a state’s welfare caseload de-
clined by 10 percent between 1995 and
1996, which is approximately the
amount by which welfare caseloads fell
in the United States, the state could
mandate that 15 percent rather than 25
percent of welfare recipients work by
1997. The state could also define easily
achievable, non-work-related activities
as “work” to help its recipients maintain
eligibility for welfare. Then the state
could exempt any families that exceed
their lifetime eligibility for welfare from
time limit provisions. If any families 
remained without benefits after these
actions, the state could continue to give
welfare benefits to those families with
federal dollars under the social services
block grant program or simply ask the
Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices to waive the time limit and work
requirement provisions entirely.
All these possibilities suggest that, if
a state does not wish to impose term
limits or work requirements, the welfare
reform bill will not force it to do so.
Even a state that adopts strict term limit
and work requirement provisions may,
however, find itself hampered by prac-
tical difficulties that arise from state-
to-state migration. Although welfare 
recipients are free to migrate from one
state to another, their welfare histories
(such as the length of time they re-
ceived welfare and whether they partic-
ipated in a work program) do not travel
with them. Indeed, at the present time,
states have no way to obtain the wel-
fare histories of newly arrived residents,
and some states do not even record this
information for their own welfare recip-
ients. Unless every state records the
welfare histories of its recipients and
exchanges this information with other
states, recipients will be able to exhaust
their eligibility for welfare, move to a
state unaware of their previous welfare
histories and receive benefits as if they
had no welfare histories.
Changes for Legal and Illegal 
Immigrants: A Dilemma for Texas
One change likely to exert a dis-
proportionate impact on the Southwest
is the restriction on the eligibility of 
immigrants. The welfare reform bill
stipulates that some current legal immi-
grants and all future legal immigrants
are ineligible for the AFDC and Food
Stamp programs for at least five years
after their immigration; an accom-
panying immigration bill gives states 
the right to deny those benefits to re-
cipients who are in the country illegally.
The impact of these provisions on
Texas is expected to be substantial: 
approximately 200,000 Texans will lose
a total of $153 million in food stamps
during 1997. One charity worker esti-
mates that 20 percent of residents in
some border counties are legal immi-
grants and that over one-third of those
immigrants could lose their benefits.
8
However, the bill is not as strict as it
first appears in this regard because any
legal immigrant who chooses to be-
come a citizen is exempt from these re-
strictions. Indeed, Immigration and
Naturalization Service officials have
been ordered to increase the speed at
which they process immigrants who
face a loss of benefits, and a historically
unprecedented number of immigrants
have been naturalized as a result. More-
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AFDC 14.0 $ 22.9
Food Stamps 27.4 $ 22.7
Medicaid 35.0 $108.3over, residents of any county whose un-
employment rate exceeds 10 percent
may be exempted from a cutoff of food
stamps. Illegal immigrants face a some-
what more difficult prospect because, in
general, they cannot become citizens of
the United States. In practice, however,
most states (with the exception of Cali-
fornia) have no plans to remove them
from the welfare rolls.
Medical care for noncitizens is an-
other area that presents difficulties for
the Southwest. Almost 100,000 legal im-
migrants are expected to lose Medicaid
benefits as a result of the welfare re-
form bill. Without Medicaid coverage,
the Texas Department of Health fears
that these immigrants will simply go 
to emergency rooms and leave Texas
taxpayers to pick up the tab.
9 Again,
though, legal immigrants may retain
Medicaid coverage if they choose to 
become citizens of the United States. 
Illegal immigrants face the greatest dif-
ficulties: the bill would strip them of all
medical coverage except for emergency
medical assistance. However, most states
(including Texas) do not yet attempt to
distinguish between legal and illegal
immigrants in the provision of Medicaid
services, which suggests that the short-
term impact of the welfare reform bill
on illegal immigrants may not be as sig-
nificant as many have feared.
10
From Welfare to Work
The welfare reform bill gives new
opportunities to states. Under the bill,
states may hire private-sector employ-
ment agencies to move individuals from
welfare to work. Since the salaries of 
social workers depend on a steady stream
of welfare recipients, some analysts be-
lieve private agencies may be better
able to help recipients find employ-
ment. States may also offer subsidies for
employers that hire welfare recipients.
Evidence from California suggests that
many long-term recipients have little
education and lack basic job skills, and
to the extent that these individuals im-
pose higher training costs on employ-
ers, subsidies might make it more
profitable for businesses to hire welfare
recipients. Governors, including Pete
Wilson of California and George Bush
of Texas, have expressed interest in
these provisions, and President Clinton
has promised to seek an expanded job
subsidy program for welfare recipients
during the 1997–98 session of Congress.
Southern states face especially large
hurdles in implementing welfare-to-
work programs because of a provision
of the bill that changes the funding
mechanism for AFDC. Before the wel-
fare reform bill was passed, the federal
government would subsidize a fixed
proportion of each recipient’s AFDC
payment and states would pay the re-
mainder. Under the new system, the
federal government gives a certain
amount of money to each state in the
form of a block grant. The block grant
given to a particular state reflects the
level at which the state previously
funded welfare programs, which means
that states that chose to give high bene-
fits under the old system will receive
larger block grants (in per capita terms)
than other states. Since there is no rea-
son to suppose that the welfare-to-work
programs will be more expensive in
high-benefit states, there is no eco-
nomic rationale for these states to re-
ceive larger block grants under the new
system. Nevertheless, the funding dif-
ferentials exist and are quite substantial.
For example, Texas will receive an esti-
mated $339 per child annually while
New York will receive an estimated
$1,998. This highly uneven funding 
system will be especially harmful to
welfare reform efforts if states ex-
pressed their (dis)satisfaction with the
old welfare system by the funding they
chose to provide for it because states
whose leaders would be most likely 
to pursue reform will lack the funds 
to proceed, while states that receive 
sufficient funds will have no interest in
reform.
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Conclusion
Much has been said about the recent
welfare reform bill. Some have sug-
gested that recipients will finally escape
the cycle of dependency and enter the
labor force, while others have charged
that impoverished families will be de-
prived of the food and medicine they
need to survive. There is a broad con-
sensus, however, that welfare reform
ought to ensure assistance for those
who need it and encourage work for
those who do not. The welfare reform
bill gives states unprecedented freedom
to make meaningful changes in the 
welfare system, but it also gives states
the freedom to resist reform. Only time
will tell whether states seize the new 
opportunities given to them or whether
they simply perpetuate rather than elim-
inate the American welfare system as
we have known it.
—Jason L. Saving
Notes
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haul Approved,” Reading Eagle, July 24, 1996.
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Changes in Welfare-Reform Bill,” National Public Radio, Morning
Edition, July 24, 1996.
5 Catholic Charities USA, as quoted by Massachusetts Senator 
Edward Kennedy in his statement on the welfare bill, July 22, 1996.
6 Senator Carol Moseley-Braun of Illinois, as quoted in “Senate 
Approves Sweeping Change in Welfare Policy,” by Robert Pear, New
York Times, July 24, 1996.
7 Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, as quoted in “As 
Pivotal Vote Nears, Welfare’s Fate Unclear,” by Vanessa Gallman, The
Record, July 22, 1996.
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Dallas Morning News, August 28, 1996.
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Mexican Recovery Boosts Border Outlook
Positive developments in the Mexican economy have given the Texas–Mexico
border a healthy outlook for 1997. Border retailers will profit as the number of Mex-
icans making the trip north for their purchases increases in 1997. As the No. 1 state
exporter to Mexico, Texas will benefit from increased U.S.–Mexican trade flows in
1997, and Texas border cities, as ports of entry for this trade, will benefit through
increased activity in transportation services, customs and legal services, and ware-
house/distribution facilities.
Mexico’s maquiladora industry, 70 percent of which is concentrated along the
U.S. border, grew strongly for two years. Maquiladoras’ dynamic expansion trans-
lates into increased opportunities for border cities in supplying maquiladora com-
panies with components, transportation and warehouse/distribution infrastructure,
and legal, accounting, financial and other professional services.
Although double-digit unemployment rates persist, employment along the border
has picked up. All major border cities have recorded a reduction in their unem-
ployment rates from a year ago.
The border’s much-lamented double-digit unemployment rate may have a silver
lining. To the extent that such high unemployment rates indicate excess labor, bor-
der cities have an advantage in attracting new company relocations and expansions.
For example, the plastics-injection molding industry has found a niche in El Paso,
and more companies in this field are locating in the city to take advantage of its 
inexpensive labor and lucrative maquiladora market across the border.
Thus, the border’s proximity to Mexico, combined with its excess labor force, of-
fers potential growth for border cities. Some of this growth is already materializing
and will surely become more evident throughout 1997.
—Lucinda Vargas
High-Tech and Distribution Fuel D/FW Expansion
The Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex continued to expand briskly in 1996, even as
the overall Texas expansion was slowing. The metroplex attracts manufacturers and
service companies with good distribution facilities and a “business friendly” envi-
ronment. Metroplex wages and construction and real estate costs remain a bargain
compared with those in other major U.S. cities. D/FW’s location in the center of
North America allows businesspeople to communicate easily with firms on both
coasts and fly nonstop to most business centers worldwide. Ninety-six percent of
the U.S. market can be served by truck or rail from D/FW warehouses in 48 hours.
In 1996, metroplex employment increased 3.6 percent, up slightly from 3.4 per-
cent job growth in 1995. Firm expansions and relocations helped feed growth in the
real estate and construction industries. Dallas and Fort Worth office markets surged
in 1996. In suburban Dallas, office occupancy rates rose above the U.S. average and,
for the first time in over a decade, construction plans were under way downtown.
Homebuilding also remained quite strong.
Over half of Texas’ high-tech jobs are in D/FW companies. These firms felt the
impact of the 1996 downturn in the electronics industry, but the effects were less
damaging to the D/FW economy than to Austin’s because of the metroplex’s eco-
nomic diversity. The metroplex also has a large share of telecommunications man-
ufacturers, which continued to expand strongly.
With relatively low costs, good location and adequate water supply, the metro-
plex should continue to grow strongly into the next century.
—Fiona SigallaPage  10 Southwest Economy   January/February 1997 
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HE DOLLAR’S VALUE has been remarkably stable over
the past nine years, according to the Dallas Fed’s 
inflation-adjusted Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar
Index (TWVD), a measure of the dollar’s value relative
to the currencies of 101 U.S. trading partners. This 
recent stability contrasts with the dollar’s 1981–87 per-
formance, when the real (inflation-adjusted) TWVD appre-
ciated more than 35 percent and then depreciated by nearly
as much.
Since 1988, the real TWVD has stayed within a relatively
tight band—never moving more than 5 percent higher or
lower than the average value of 76.7. Interestingly, this repre-
sents a return to a pre-1981 pattern. From 1976 to 1980, the
dollar also never deviated from its average level by more than
5 percent. Moreover, the 1976–80 average, 74.6, is very close
to the 1988–96 average (Chart 1). What does the dollar’s re-
turn to its earlier levels and
stability tell us about the U.S.
economy?
Long-run changes in the
trend of the real value of 
the dollar primarily reflect
changes in productivity differ-
entials between the United
States and the rest of the
world in products that com-
pete in world markets. So the
dollar’s stable behavior over
the long term suggests that
U.S. productivity has been
fairly stable relative to the 
rest of the world. Although
the dollar’s run-up during the
1980s was substantial, most economists attribute this unusual
appreciation and the subsequent fall to a sharp, temporary
tightening of monetary policy combined with expansionary
fiscal policy during the early years of the Reagan presidency.
If the real value of the dollar had shown persistent appre-
ciation, the likely reason would have been an increase in rel-
ative U.S. productivity. For example, a permanent increase in
the productivity of U.S. carmakers over their foreign counter-
parts would contribute to a sustained increase in the real
value of the dollar. Sustained shifts in demand for U.S. or 
foreign goods could also change the long-run level of the 
exchange rate, although this would be less likely to drive
long-run changes than would shifts in productivity.
The relationship between the real value of the dollar and
long-run productivity differentials is summarized by the theory
of  purchasing power parity. This theory maintains that the
overall real value of any country’s currency moves toward a
long-run value with the rest of the world provided relative
productivity differentials in traded goods remain constant and
no prolonged shifts in relative goods demand occur. Hence,
the long-run stability of the Dallas Fed’s Real Trade-Weighted
Value of the Dollar Index suggests that U.S. productivity rela-
tive to the rest of the world has remained fairly constant over
the past 20 years.
But what drives short-run movements in the real TWVD? 
In the short run, even if the long-run relative productivity 
differentials don’t change, the real TWVD can deviate sub-
stantially from its central trend. Over the business cycle,
prospects for growth can change markedly, altering relative
demand and the real exchange rate. Nominal (not adjusted 
for inflation) exchange rate volatility can also translate into
real exchange rate volatility if domestic prices do not in-
stantaneously adjust to chang-
ing international conditions.
So despite the movement of
the real TWVD toward a long-
run level, tremendous short-
run volatility can occur.
Although the long-run trend
in the real value of the dollar
has remained fairly con-
stant, on an annual basis, it
has shown more volatility in
the past nine years than in
1976–80. While swings of
more than 5 percent in less
than nine months were rare
before 1981, they have been
common since 1988. One pos-
sible explanation is the further integration of world capital
markets, which has increased both nominal exchange rate
variability and real exchange rate volatility (as domestic prices
are slow to adjust to international price differentials). Another
explanation may be that there have been some unusual inter-
national events since 1988 that were unlike the influences of
the late 1970s, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and
the consequent changes in Eastern Europe, the 1992 Euro-
pean Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis and the 1994 devalua-
tion of the Mexican peso. All these events could have
contributed to greater short-run volatility while not substan-





Dollar’s Value Stable for Nearly a Decade
Chart 1
Real Trade-Weighted Value of the U.S. Dollar
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For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s BBS, Fed Flash,
(214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953, and WWW
home page, www.dallasfed.org.
Thousands of persons September–November 1996 Index, January 1981 = 100
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Industrial Production Index (TIPI)
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OB GROWTH IN the Eleventh District states—
Louisiana, New Mexico and Texas—picked up in 
October and November after a very sluggish third 
quarter. Employment growth rebounded in Texas and
New Mexico but slowed during October and Novem-
ber in Louisiana, where it was sluggish for most of 
the year. Economic indicators suggest District employment
growth should continue to be stronger than the weak growth
posted in the third quarter.
Texas’ private job growth reached an annualized 2.4 per-
cent in October and November, up from 1.6 percent in the
third quarter. Employment growth in Texas had been damp-
ened by slower homebuilding and a slump in some high-
technology industries.
New Mexico job growth increased 2.5 percent in the fourth
quarter after falling 1.3 percent in the third quarter. The ser-
vice sector rebounded strongly in October and November, 
J
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment Total nonfarm employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
11/96 118.6 122.9 154.7 441.2 1,057.5 1,473.6 5,177.5 8,304.5 1,800.8 717.8
10/96 117.1 123.0 154.4 438.3 1,056.6 1,470.9 5,167.1 8,287.3 1,798.2 716.0
9/96 116.9 123.2 154.8 435.1 1,055.7 1,467.3 5,158.6 8,271.5 1,804.9 715.8
8/96 116.4 123.7 155.0 433.3 1,056.4 1,473.4 5,149.6 8,267.7 1,798.6 717.8
7/96 115.9 123.3 154.7 432.7 1,053.5 1,462.1 5,140.6 8,243.6 1,797.9 718.8
6/96 116.0 123.0 155.7 432.3 1,053.7 1,457.9 5,136.0 8,235.6 1,793.6 717.5
5/96 116.5 122.2 155.9 431.5 1,052.7 1,456.9 5,116.3 8,213.3 1,793.5 716.0
4/96 116.7 122.2 155.6 430.5 1,051.7 1,455.3 5,097.7 8,190.8 1,792.2 712.2
3/96 116.1 122.0 156.1 429.9 1,049.1 1,453.2 5,077.1 8,165.4 1,793.1 711.4
2/96 115.0 120.6 155.6 428.5 1,047.3 1,452.7 5,064.5 8,148.6 1,794.0 711.8
1/96 113.8 120.5 154.7 424.6 1,044.7 1,451.0 5,055.8 8,130.8 1,795.3 710.1
12/95 113.3 119.6 154.2 420.1 1,039.1 1,460.9 5,067.2 8,141.5 1,788.1 702.1
s
up 4.8 percent and 7.4 percent, respectively. New Mexico’s
manufacturing sector remains weak, with employment declin-
ing 1.3 percent in the past two months.
Louisiana’s employment growth slowed to 0.4 percent in
October and November, after increasing 1.2 percent in the
third quarter. Louisiana’s manufacturing sector has been very
weak in 1996, and employment fell 7.4 percent in the past 
two months. For the first time in many years, however, higher
oil and gas prices have helped boost Louisiana employment
in mining.
The Federal Reserve’s Texas Leading Index increased
strongly in November, suggesting that employment growth
over the next three months should continue to be stronger
than during the weak third quarter. The increase in the index
has been driven by increases in most indicators, particularly
in the help-wanted and stock price indexes.
—Fiona Sigalla
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What’s Behind the Economic Headlines?
The first-quarter Economic Review offers new insight into three 
issues that dominate headlines but often lack in-depth analysis:
how to evaluate tax reform proposals, inflation and its relation-
ship to capacity utilization, and Mexican banks’ role in the 1994
peso crash.
Economic Review is a quarterly journal from the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas. Free subscriptions are available by calling 800-
333-4460 or 214-922-5254, or by faxing 214-922-5268.
Taxation, Growth and Welfare: A Framework for Analysis and
Some Preliminary Results by Mark A. Wynne
Here’s a framework for analyzing the validity of claims about tax re-
form proposals, particularly as they would affect long-run economic
growth. The analysis includes a look at how U.S. tax rates on capital, labor and consumption compare
with similar tax rates of other major industrialized countries.
Is There a Stable Relationship Between Capacity Utilization and Inflation? by Kenneth M. Emery and
Chih-Ping Chang
Economists look at whether the rate of capacity utilization remains a useful predictor of future changes
in inflation.
Liberalization, Privatization and Crash: Mexico’s Banking System in the 1990s by William C. Gruben
and Robert P. McComb
Evidence now suggests that the 1991–92 privatization of Mexican banks sowed the seeds of the 1994
peso crisis.
Taxation, Growth, and Welfare:
A Framework for Analysis and
Some Preliminary Results
Mark A. Wynne
Is There a Stable Relationship
Between Capacity Utilization
And Inflation?
Kenneth M. Emery and Chih-Ping Chang
Liberalization, Privatization,
And Crash: Mexico’s Banking
System in the 1990s
William C. Gruben and Robert P. McComb
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